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Fitch rating agency last week added its voice to the rising trend of accolades for the banking reforms flagged off by Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The agency noted that there have been considerable improvements in corporate governance and disclosure levels in the nation's banking industry and attributed it to the banking reforms initiated by Sanusi.
The apex bank's reforms has put risk managers in the banking system persistently on their toes since the campaign was flagged off on August 14, 2009, with the ouster of the managing directors and boards of five banks adjudged to have grossly abused lending rules.
The cleansing exercise, which has now been extended to a total of eight banks, has sent shock waves down the spine of bankers. The reforms, like the consolidation exercise of 2005, have been greeted with mixed reactions.
While some, including the highly rated rating agency, Fitch, see it as a necessary tonic to re-jig a banking system which was becoming notorious for fraud and barefaced flouting of lending rules and sliding precipitously towards systemic failure, others criticise it for unnecessarily raising the risk factor on the nation’s banking system through inept management of the bad news emanating from the audit report ordered by the apex bank.
However, even the staunch critics of Sanusi are shocked by the rot in the banking system that the reform has unearthed. From all indications, it is obvious that Nigeria was postponing the evil day by building its economy around a banking system that its managers would mostly lend depositors' money to themselves, while starving the productive arm of the economy of funds. The reform has exposed a banking system with preponderance for scandalous lending, insider dealings, paper profit and insidious financial engineering of its books. The money market was just waiting for the last straw that could have taken down the entire system. A timely intervention has averted that calamity.
Be that as it may, the gains of the reforms can only be enhanced if the CBN takes appropriate steps to ease the artificial credit squeeze that is beginning to choke the economy into avoidable recession. Banks are no longer lending even to well-rated fund users. Lending, the main business of banking, is now done with tears. You cannot trust the borrower to pay back. At the same time, the regulator's axe is dangling behind you. Ironically, the credit squeeze is by no means the product of a liquidity squeeze in the system. In fact, the system is awash with cash. Depositors now practically beg banks to pick up their funds while the banks grudgingly do so at atrociously low rates.
The only transactions thriving in the money market now are on bonds and treasury bills. That probably explains why what had hitherto been considered junk bonds by some states run by grossly inept leadership now enjoy instant over-subscription.
The reason for the credit squeeze in the money market is the morbid fear that the apex bank has instilled into the spines of risk managers. No one wants to offend CBN examiners who have now become something of demi-gods in terms of determining which facility should be provisioned for, even when it has not matured and could not rightly be classified as non-performing.
There are reports that some examiners would just look at a facility and the business for which it is used to fund and declare that, given the current trend in the affected industry, the loan beneficiary cannot service the loan and should therefore be provisioned for.
The long and short of it is that risk managers have been thrown into confusion as the apex bank is yet to draw up new lending rules. The existing ones are over-stretched. While it is true that only the devil would advocate a lax credit policy in the type of economy we run in Nigeria , the regulator has to consider the peculiar environment that the Nigerian banking system operates. Under normal circumstances all loans should be collaterised. But like one risk manager stressed recently, if the rule is followed rigidly, very few lending would be done. For instance, in the past, if a reliable contractor flashes contract documents signed with the federal government, banks would not hesitate to finance the contract without collateral.
All that ended on August 14, 2009, with the ouster of the gang of five in the banking system. Today, no risk manager ventures to fund such projects because the apex bank does not even trust the federal government to pay the contractor on successful completion of the job. The tendency these days is for banks to be ordered to make provision for such facility even before it matures. That is largely responsible for the credit squeeze in the face of excess liquidity.
The regulator has tightened the noose without taking pains to set down its perceived new credit rules in black and white. The result is confusion with the risk managers opting to err on the side of extreme caution just to avoid the regulator's big stick.
The CBN is not alone in the blame for the artificial credit squeeze currently choking the economy. The federal government takes a good chunk of the blame. Even if the regulator of the money market had set down its new lending rules in black and white and was willing to accommodate understandable cases of uncollateralized facility to some fund users with credible rating, no one in the money market would lend to anyone in Nigeria’s beleaguered textile industry. Besides, the entire manufacturing arm of the nation's economy would remain a risk manager's ‘no-go area.’
Nigeria has four petroleum refineries but none is producing petroleum products. In the last two years, the sum of N54.4 billion has been washed down the drain in the name of turnaround maintenance for the four refineries, yet Nigeria imports 100 per cent of its refined petroleum products needs.
The textile industry pays the highest price for the official sabotage that has incapacitated the nation’s refineries. Low pour fuel oil (LPFO or black oil) is an essential fuel for the textile industry. The product is more or less a waste material from refined crude. If local refineries were working, black oil cannot cost more than N20 per litre. The cost of the imported one is four times what could be obtained at home. Besides unfettered smuggling of subsidised textile from Asia into the country, the astronomical cost of black oil is a major cause of the demise of the textile industry and a disincentive to lending to the industry. That, obviously, is neither the problem of the risk managers nor that of the regulator of the money market. Corruption is to blame for the incapacitation of the refineries and the escalating cost of LPFO, while corrupt customs officials are the backbone of the smugglers that have priced Nigerian textiles out of the market.
No bank wants to touch manufacturing firms with a 10-foot pole because the best of their seemingly bankable projects cannot pass the risk manager's feasibility test when the dearth of infrastructure in the land is factored in. That explains why banks would rather invest in junk bonds than finance bankable manufacturing projects that would create jobs.
While the CBN can sort out its amorphous lending rules in a jiffy and get banks back into real financial intermediation, the federal government has a pretty long way to go in making the manufacturing sector a risk manager's attraction. The launch pad for that must be a relentless campaign against corruption.
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